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IN 1816, Thomas Burn Catherwood, a clerk who had served two years as a member
of the supply and accounting branch of the army medical department, completed
an account of his experiences during the late war. The manuscript of his Narrative
ofsome ofthe transactions ofthe Purveyor's department which served with the Army
in the Peninsula under the commandofthe Duke ofWellington. With anecdotes relating
to the conduct ofthe medicaldepartment ofthat Army covers some 140 pages and was
intended for publication; but for some unknown reason it never appeared in print,
and even its existence was not generally known until it was catalogued as belonging
to the Library ofthe Wellcome Institute for the History ofMedicine.'
It is unlikely, however, that it would have attracted much attention had it been
accessible earlier, for the honesty and efficiency ofthe officers concerned with hospital
finance remained for many years one ofthe more recondite aspects ofthe Peninsular
War, perhaps because so many official papers had been inadvertently destroyed in
the 1840s. Even General Sir Neil Cantlie, in his recent history of the army medical
department, treats the work of the purveyors briefly and with some confusion. Ad-
mitting first that theirjob "was not an easy one and the temptation of making money
considerable",2 he says that "it seems only too true that some feathered their own
nests";3 but in a later chapter, although mentioning J. W. Fortescue's condemnation
ofthe general hospitals as "hotbeds ofwaste anddishonestdealing",4 he instancesthe
director-general of the army medical department, Sir James McGrigor's inspection
ofthose at Lisbon and Coimbra as evidence oforder and regularity, and declares that
"no major administrative scandals were ever brought to light, and the Commander-
in-Chief on his visits never had adverse comments to make."5
It is Catherwood who sheds fresh light on the matter, for his long account had the
specific object of unfolding "the grand mystery of the department; viz. the manner
of plundering the soldier on the one hand and the public on the other, which is
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technically called in the department 'making money' or 'chiselling them'."6 It reads
like a combination of sensational journalism and comic opera, written by a disap-
pointed spinster, but if used with care, it can nonetheless be a source of useful
information.
Catherwood, the son ofa watchmaker in the East End of London, was appointed
a purveyor's clerk in May 1812. He was sent immediately to Portugal, and worked
there, in Spain, and in France, until the end of the war in 1814. During this period
he was acting as an assistant to the purveyor-general, much of the time at head-
quarters, so he was in a position to know what was going on. He saw the embezzling
which his colleagues were organizing, but he refused to take part in it,7 and his
refusal, combined with a dour and self-righteous attitude, not unnaturally made him
disliked. He had worked hard at his official duties and, at the end of the war, had
hopes of promotion, which on demobilization would have entitled him to half-pay.
But his superior officer deprived him ofthis privilege by submitting an unfavourable
personal report, so that Catherwood's eventual attack was barbed as much by
"resentment for the bad treatment . .. experienced"8 as by feelings of duty. It must
be admitted that he had an axe to grind, and that to prove his former colleagues'
guilt so as to obtain the promotion he believed was his by right, he presents them in
the worst possible light.
Another oddity is that Catherwood, ostensibly on the side of the angels, was very
prejudiced against Wellington and McGrigor, so that one finds in his narrative an
occasional and disconcerting championship ofmen whom he had earlier condemned.
Thisprejudice would be incomprehensible but for the fact that ifCatherwood disliked
his colleagues, he was still intenselyjealous ofthe status and privileges ofhis depart-
ment: he exhibits to an almost pathological degree the traditional hostility felt by the
civil for the military departments which bedevilled the army throughout the war.
Another reason for Catherwood's hostility towards McGrigor lay in his belief that
McGrigor had beentrying to make him divulge information about the alleged frauds,
without any real intention of repaying him with promotion.9
These considerations apart, it remains a fact that Catherwood's account stands up
very well to examination. His dates and places are always correct; the monthly
returns ofthe army show that he and the people he mentions were where he said they
were stationed. Several unsavoury incidents involving purveyors do come to the
surface in the McGrigor papers, and his comments on the character ofcertain medical
men are independently corroborated by other writers-he describes a physician,
Charles Tice, as having a quarrelsome nature, and this fits inwith deputy-inspector of
hospitals Thomas Thomson's allusions to Tice's "mean, selfish and irascible dis-
position".10 The overall circumstantial detail and scraps of reported conversation
6Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 6.
7He may have been a Methodist: his family lived in Bunhill Row, a street which backed on to
the City Road, where John Wesley had lived and built a famous chapel.
8 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 67.
* Ibid., p. 61. SirJames McGrigor(1771-1858). Inspectorofhospitals underWellington, 1812-1814.
Appointed director-general ofthe army medical department, 13 June 1815.
10 Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine Library: MS. No. 4781. Thomas Thomson,
Medical sketches, 1813-1815, p. 20.
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ring true, and it is undeniable that two of the chief purveyors, against whom
Catherwood inveighed, were ignominiously dismissed from the service in 1822,
"having been guilty offraudulent practices and gross misconduct in the Peninsula.""1
In particulars too, Catherwood can be shown to be telling the truth, however
incredible it may seem. He claimed first ofall that the financial system was by its very
nature open to abuse. The purveyors were responsible for supplying and maintaining
the general hospitals ofthe army-they had to repair and keep the buildings used for
this purpose clean, provide all food and drink, medicines, equipment and changes of
linen, pay the wages ofhospital servants and labourers, keep all accounts and provide
necessary stationery.
Many supplies were sent from England, conveyed up-country by the commissariat,
and delivered over to thepurveyors in return for requisitions signed by senior officers,
and receipts; but throughout the war, perishable goods such as foodstuffs, and
urgently-needed replacements, as well as the cost of services, had to be bought or
paid for in the country, and for this the purveyors naturally required ready money.
This was obtained from two sources, known as the cash and the stoppage accounts.
The first wasfairly simple: the purveyor-general submitted anestimate ofthe expenses
of the general hospitals for the coming month, and applied through the inspector
of hospitals at headquarters to the military secretary for that sum. In 1812-1814
the monthly estimate was between £20,0O-25,000, and it was always forthcoming,
as Wellington gave the hospitals financial priority.
The second source was rather more complicated. Each soldier had 6d. stopped from
his pay each day in payment for his ration offood. When he was taken to a general
hospital, however, 9d. was stopped from his pay to cover the cost of his food and
that of medical comforts such as port wine, fresh fruit and milk. Clerks or servants
went round the wards each day and took notes of the names and regiments of the
patients, which information was transmitted to the regimental paymasters, checked
against their own records of absences, and the amount owing to the medical depart-
ment was thus calculated and credited to its account at the military chest. This was a
paper transaction; pay was so much in arrears that the paymasters could do no more
than inform the medicaldepartment that hadthemoneybeen available,so muchwould
have been to its credit; while the purveyors in turn spent up to the limit of the sum
to which they were entitled, paid when they could, and asked their creditors to wait
for the remainder. Minor assistants, such as washerwomen and labourers, were paid
withtheminimum ofdelay, butshopkeepers andmerchantsusuallyreceivedsomething
on account and were asked to wait, they being better able to extend credit. Each
transaction had to be accounted for by bills and signed receipts, and these vouchers
were periodically made up into returns, which had to be scrutinized by senior medical
as well as purveying officers. But the unscrupulous could find an abundance of ways
of nullifying these checks, and it might even be said that elaborations in the system
merely acted as a spur to criminal ingenuity.
Each day an abstract was drawn up of the different foodstuffs required for the
diets of the sick, and these formed the basis for the weekly and monthly returns.
Il Sir Robert Drew (editor), Medical officers in the British Army, 1660-1960. vol. 1, 1660-1898,
London, Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1968, pp. 75, 129.
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But such abstracts needed no alteration to benefit the purveyors. They were in charge
of the storekeepers whose duty was to issue food and extras such as lemons, sugar,
etc., to the ward-masters, and by the use of false weights and measures, the patients
could be fobbed offwith smaller amounts than those actually prescribed by the doc-
tors. Spirits could be watered and tea and sugar were often dampened to increase
their weight. The difference was euphemistically termed a surplus, which the deputy-
purveyor could sell, either retaining the profit or sharing it with the storekeeper.
The latter, remarked Catherwood, is "considered more or less fitted for his employ-
ment according to the quantity ofsurplus that he can create."12
Perhaps Catherwood is exaggerating here to some extent. No doubt these minor
frauds went on, but as they were more easily detected than other stratagems, they
were a less attractive way of making money. As was remarked during the post-war
investigations, "it was ever considered by the purveyors as a circumstance of conse-
quence that no ground ofcomplaint, either as to the quantity or quality ofprovisions
should exist, as any reports ofsuch a nature being made to the medical officers, must
have led to investigations, which were ever studiously avoided."13
Nor was there any need for the purveyor to run such risks, for as Catherwood
explained, they could make enormous profits with the minimum ofeffort when large
quantities of goods were bought in the country. He said that it was customary for
the officer in question to buy only what was required, but that he would persuade
the merchant "to make a bill for the quantity for the employment of which he had
obtained a voucher, and to annex a receipt for the value ofthose quantities, and thus
he obtains a voucher for the payment ofa larger quantity ofmoney than he has really
paid, and the value ofthe surplus provisions goes in the first instance into his pocket.
These surplus provisions form the principal sources of the profits of a purveyor, and
the amount not only would astonish one unacquainted with the department, but
have more than once exercised the credulity ofthe chief ofthe departmenthimself."'14
As long as the merchants received the money they had bargained for, claimed
Catherwood, theywould sign almost anything, and he cited one named Venancio who
signed otherwise blank bills for the convenience ofone ofthe purveyors.
Later investigations proved that Catherwood's accusations were founded in fact-
indeed, that there were countless instances ofsuch fraud. When asked if he was paid
the exact amount of his account, a merchant of Abrantes replied that he was paid
"exactly what was due to him, but that he received more money because the deputy
purveyors inserted in his accounts larger quantities of articles, and some articles
besideswhich he had notfurnished, saying theyhad purchased this,and for this reason
he returned them the difference between his account and those of the hospital."'5
A clerk named Edward Fairman, when employed to detect frauds in the documents
brought before the Audit Office, also declared that "the contractors were always
ready to sign away papers put before them on the receipt of the amount of their
respective Monthly Bills."''6
2 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 7.
13 Public Record Office/Audit Office/10/32/p. 227. E. J. Fairman to J. Mallet, 23 December 1818.
Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 8.
15 Public Record Office/Audit Office/14/32/pp. 13-14, 4 December 1818.
'6 Ibid., 10/32/p. 288.
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Another Portuguese, asked why he had signed as a witness to an account, although
he had nothing to do with the man to whom the money was paid, declared that he
had "signed without knowing what he signed, and it was well known to him that
frequently papers were carried about to the coffee houses to be signed."17 Lewis
Moreira, interrogated as to the name of a witness on his accounts, admitted that he
thought he was "a man taken at random to sign ... as was the customary practice."18
Most ofthe Portuguese submitted accounts intheir ownlanguage, butsigned accounts
in English whenever requested to do so, and according to Manoel Dias of Coimbra,
the former were destroyed as soon as they had been compared with the latter, and
the English receipt signed.'9
It was noticed in 1821 that "many persons swore that the signatures to receipts
purporting to have been given by them were false, and that no such receipts ever had
been signed by them."20 Francisco Jose Vieira, for example, when confronted with
nine accounts accredited to him, acknowledged the signature to eight but declared
the ninth false; and he disavowed having supplied such articles as wood, saying
that "the purveyors sent for him to sign those accounts, and in truth he signed
everything 'na boa fe!!' [in good faith]."2'
Besides inflated and false accounts, the purveyors are shown to have evaded
treasury regulations in otherways. Bills were supposed to be supported by a certificate
from a man ofgood character, to the effect that the prices therein stated corresponded
to the fair market price. But Antonio Cartacho, whose signature appeared on fifteen
such certificates, told the auditor-general that "he signed everything without enquiry,
being told that it was a form practised on such occasions."22
When a new hospital was set up, the purveyor was charged with thejob ofmaking
the available accommodation habitable. A surplus could be obtained from the cost
of the materials, and the workmen could be tricked into signing lists which showed
them to haveworked longer than they actually had. The laundry listscould befalsified
by inflating the number of items on the bills which would undergo scrutiny, and
examination ofvarious laundresses showed this to have takenplace. Maria Clara and
Maria Rita, both washerwomen who worked for the Estrela hospital in Lisbon,
declared that they "never received anything like"23 the sum which appeared on their
accounts. Four bills for the year 1810 were for 547,670 reis (£154), 68,450 reis (£19),
655,705 reis (£184) and 269,105 reis (L76),24 whereas the women said that the largest
sum paid to them was about 10 moedas (£13 lOs. Od.).25 It turned out that they had
only had charge ofthe linen for the last three years of the war, but that Maria Clara
had signed receipts for washing for the whole period: she explained to the auditor-
general that "they sent for her to the Estrela hospital and presented to her all the
17 Ibid., 14/28/p. 6. Joz6 de Sta. Rita Vieira, Lisbon, 7 November 1816.
18 Ibid., 14/27/p. 146. Lewis Moreira, 5 November 1816.
19 Ibid., p. 60. Manoel Moreira Dias, Coimbra, 4 October 1816.
2" Ibid., 10/33/p. 410. 15 November 1821. 21 Ibid., 14/27/p. 81. F. J. Vieira, Coimbra, 7 October 1816.
22 Ibid., A. J. Cartacho, 20 June 1816.
" Ibid., 14/30/p. 143. 11 September 1817.
24 Ibid. 1000 reis (1 milreis) was worth about 5s. 7jd. 1 dollar equals about 800 reis. The English
equivalents ofthe sums quoted in reis are only approximate, having been taken to the nearest pound.
16 Moeda as used here meant a gold coin-moeda de ouro-(Eng. Moidore) which was worth 27s.
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receipts forwashing to sign, which she did naboafe; so much so that on one occasion
she remained a whole afternoon signing receipts, and when she had done, they gave
her 800 reis" [4s. 6d.].26
Catherwood said that it was especially easy to defraud the government over the
wages of the hospital servants, for daily records were not kept of their employment
-for the sake of neatness, one clerk was told to write up the accounts at the end
ofthe month-making them up would have been the more accurate description ofhis
work. The occasional false name was slipped in, but the usual ploy was to show them
tohaveworkedlongerhoursthanwasin factthecase. Thisjob,remarkedCatherwood,
was often given "to the clerk employed in the victualling branch, as a reward for his
fitness in that employment".27 Edward Fairman, who had taken an active part in
defrauding the government, later admitted that he was well "aware of the frauds
which took place in the Servants' Pay Lists."28
The stationery accounts formed an irresistible source of outdoor relief for the un-
deserving poor, as requisitions were not checked until after supplies had been bought.
The medical board in London was itselfpartly to blame, because its members refused
to send out the amounts required. Britain was suffering from a serious paper shortage
throughout the. war, so that supplies were often hard to come by and very expensive.
The board, in a misguided ifunderstandable attempt ateconomy, restricted quotas to
unrealistic levels, thereby "occasioning the purchase oflarge quantities at exorbitant
prices abroad."29 Towards the end ofthe war, the stationery accounts had become so
inflated that McGrigor put his foot down and refused to allow any more purchases
ofbooks and paper in the Peninsula at public expense.
The financial system ofthe general hospitals was obviously in need ofreform, but
its liability to abuse could have been surmounted ifthe officers engaged in its adminis-
tration had been better supervised. It was expected that some would try to line their
own pockets, but when two ofthe senior purveyors were themselves guilty offlagrant
dishonesty, which Catherwood describes in great detail, they set the tone for the
rest of their subordinates, who then knew that their activities would be condoned
and even protected from investigation, lest embarrassing facts should be uncovered
and prove the ruin of all.
Joseph Gunson was the head ofthe purveyor's department from 1808 until March
1812,30 and Catherwood claimed that he had acquired a large fortune as a result of
over three years' concentrated embezzling. He evidently believed that his pay was
insufficient, for he applied for an extra allowance in 1810, but the members of the
medical board replied that it was not possible. As they wrote, "we must lament that
the arduous duties so meritoriously executed by that officer are thus inadequately
rewarded. But the regulations ofthe treasury confine the pay ofa purveyor to twenty
shillings a day, and when anything beyond that rate ... has been granted, it was done
"Audit Office/14/30/p. 144.
27 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 9.
I' Audit Office/10/32/p. 229.
29 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 9.
30 See Drew, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 129, no. 1970. Gunson was appointed deputy-purveyor
on 4 April 1800, purveyor on 16 February 1809, and went on half-pay on 25 July 1814.
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on the particular authority of the general commanding that station."'3' When the
army was so short ofmoney, however, Wellington was unlikely to endorse Gunson's
request for an increase in pay, so the idea was dropped in favour of unofficial ways
ofmaking money.
Much ofGunson's wealth resulted from his association with a Portuguese merchant
called Lewis Moreira, whom he ordered to supply all the hospitals, whether in Lisbon
or farther up-country. A witness examined at Abrantes said that "the intimacy was
so great that it was generally repeated that they decided the profits between them,
the purveyor blindly approved whatever Lewis Moreira determined,"32 and he even
said that Moreira had once told him "that ifhe could not agree well with the purveyor
in charge at Abrantes, to let him know and that he would have him sent away, as he
had already done with two others."3 Actual proof that Gunson was directly con-
cerned in defrauding the government can be found in the testimony of Gregorio
SimOens, a merchant's son, who was taken to the Estrela hospital "where were present
two English officers whom he very well knew to be Messrs. Bacon and Gunson".34
He was presented with several receipts and asked to sign them, but when he demurred
"by reason of his not knowing what they were [Moreira] told him to sign them as
there was no danger whatever in so doing, which the said Bacon and Gunson likewise
intimated by gestures, desiring him to sign the papers."35 Gunson also adjusted the
stoppage accounts to his own benefit: it was calculated after the war that he had
pocketed the money for 45,123 diets for fictitious patients in Lisbon alone." The
average cost ofeach diet is unknown, but theirnumber indicates the scale uponwhich
his operations were conducted.
The total sum embezzled by Gunson is also unknown-the auditor-general spoke
of"very large remittances ... to England ... which were most satisfactorily brought
home to him",37 and the commissioners for audit mentioned many thousands of
pounds. An anonymous writer declared in 1850 that Gunson had amassed a fortune
of£65,000, and although this cannot be confirmed it is certainly possible.38
According to Catherwood, Gunson was assisted by two clerks named Francis
Bishop and Edward Fairman, who lost few chances of feathering their own nests.
Bishop had been engaged in examining the provision accounts at Lisbon, but he
was given leave ofabsence early in 1812 because Gunson was retiring(ostensibly from
ill health) and needed someone to help with the task of arranging all his accounts
for submission to the treasury. When Bishop returned to the army in 1813, however,
81 Public Record Office/War Office/7/109/p. 24. John Weir (director-general of the army medical
department) to Dr. James Franck (inspector ofhospitals underWellington, 1809-1811). 27 December
1810.
88 Audit Office/14/28/p. 49. Manoel Nunes Carvalho, Abrantes, 24 December 1816. "Decided"
could be a mistake for "divided".
33 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 14/27/p. 35. Gregorio Simoens, Lisbon, 9 March 1815. 96 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 10/32/p. 295. Fairman to Commissioners ofAudit, 9 March 1819.
87 Ibid., 10/33/p. 410. 15 November 1821.
88 Lancet, 1850, i: 733. Biography of G. J. Guthrie. This anonymous account contains some
interesting information about peculation in the Peninsula, but there are many errors of detail. The
explanation maybe that McGrigor or someone of equivalent seniority wrote it from memory and
thus got some facts wrong.
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he took over the the accounts ofthe station atVitoria and refused to share the profits
with his colleague Copeland, saying "you will perhaps think it strange that during
the last three months I have retained the whole of the surplus, but you should con-
sider that for a long time I have been settling accounts in the rear, where I have
had no opportunity of making anything."39
Catherwood shows that a talent for conspicuous consumption was well developed
in purveyor's clerk Fairman, describing him as "a man of most dissolute manners
and the most profligate profusion; he played deeply, drank hardly (a bottle of
champaign [sic] to tune his nerves before rising from bed) and he kept three girls,
with all of whom he slept together."40 Fairman's morals were his own affair, but no
harem could be run on a clerk's wages of five shillings a day, still less on extended
credit, and it was the application of public money to private pleasure which made
him an undesirable government servant. Nor was Catherwood exaggerating: the
auditors admitted after the war that many objections could be made to Fairman's
character, but that he was such a valuable source of information that his defects
should be overlooked, and he was employed in their office to discover evidence of
fraud in the purveyors' accounts. Fairman's only attractive feature was his hand-
writing.
Catherwood worked under George Dickson,41 Gunson's successor, so he gives
much more detail as to his misconduct, and these accusations have also been sub-
stantiated by independent authorities. Appointed in January 1812, Dickson was
apparently chosen to put a stop to the fraud which was suspected but never actually
proved during the war. However, by the time he left in October 1813, he had not
only carried on embezzling, but had adjusted the regulations so as to make it easier
for himself and thus for his subordinates. The chief example of such manipulation
can be seen in the matter of the sick maintenance accounts. Regulations stated that
at the end of the month the principal medical officer of a hospital station would
appoint a board ofthree medical officers whose duty it was to certify "it has examined
the Return and compared itwiththedaily dietabstracts, and ... it finds thatthe Diet
and Extras therein stated to have been issued to the patients and servants in His
Majesty's general hospital, conformably to the prescription ofthe attendant medical
director."42 Dickson had the words "and compared with the daily diet abstracts"
struck out, by arguing that "while the return referred to other vouchers, it was not a
complete voucher in itself, and that the Commissioners for Accounts might hereafter
demand the daily abstracts which would cause inconvenience, on account of their
number, and the slovenly manner in which they are written."43 This was true, but it
also meant that quantities could be inflated and written down in the return with much
less chance ofdetection.
At Salamanca, Dickson was obliged to ask one of his clerks to check the surplus,
39 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 45.
40 Ibid., p. 18.
41 George Dickson-see Drew, op. cit., note 11 above, p. 75, no. 1217. Surgeon to the 12th
Dragoons bypurchase, 12 December 1793. Purveyor, 4April 1800. M.D. St. Andrews, F.R.C.P. Edin.
1796.
*s Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 17.
4" Ibid.
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remarking that "he had summed it himself, but doubted his accuracy because the
amount of it was so considerable."" Between September and October 1812, he had
managed to create a profit of 22,000 dollars, the equivalent of £6,937 10s. Od., and
on top ofthis was the milk surplus: 540 pints had been consumed, but vouchers had
been obtained for 15,650pints, so that hepocketed another £288.45 A similar situation
occurred at Vizeu, under deputy-purveyor Smyth, and the board of general officers
there not unnaturally felt that some of the quantities stated were excessive, and that
the clerk had made a mistake. But Dickson forced them to sanction the return,
shouting "what do you know of accounts? You have nothing to do but to sign your
names. As for you, Mr. Power [the staff surgeon] you are drunk at the moment, and
ifyou give me any more trouble I will put you in arrest."46
Dickson's avarice often led him to defraud his subordinates as well as the govern-
ment; at Ciudad Rodrigo, for example, deputy-purveyor Findlay was ill, but when
Dickson wenttovisit him, he took away all hispapers and settled the account, keeping
the surplus of 3,000 dollars (£675) for himself. The clerks, for their part, resented the
loss of their perquisites, and formulated ways of cheating Dickson to benefit them-
selves. Deputy-purveyor Copeland (apparently a relative ofMcGrigor) was peculiarly
successful at this, and was reputed to pay his confidential clerks, Sherrin and Atkins,
400 dollars (£90) each a month.
Lest it seem that Catherwood was allowing his dislike for Dickson to colour his
imagination, it should be remembered that the purveyor-general was found to have
claimed stoppages for 146,657 fictitious patients at Lisbon alone;47 and that although
he was in the Peninsula less time than Gunson, he is supposed to have acquired a
private fortune of£95,000.48
When Dickson left in October 1813, he was succeeded by purveyor William James,
who served in that capacity until the end of the war. Catherwood had a number of
interesting things to say about James, ofwhom little information is otherwise known.
McGrigor had the highest opinion of James, and declared that "a man of higher
honour, more unspotted integrity, abler as an officer or more amiable in any quality
as a man does not exist in any department ofthe army."49 Catherwood admitted his
amiability, but complained that he was not an efficient head ofdepartment. Dickson,
for all his faults, had been an industrious man, and had kept his four clerks very
busy, but James lacked decision and neglected his correspondence. As Catherwood
recalled, "he appeared to dread the very sight of a paper, and it was with the greatest
difficulty I could obtain his signature: frequently matters of some consequence were
delayed for the want of it."50 James also forgot to requisition account books for
headquarters, and refused to sanction the purchase of any in the town, owing to
McGrigor's recent prohibition of such expenditure. This was unfortunate, as the
44 Ibid., p. 10
4' Ibid., p. 13
4" Ibid., p. 15.
47 Audit Office/10/32/p. 295. Fairman to the Commissioners ofAudit, 9 March 1819.
48 Lancet, op. cit., note 38 above.
4" McGrigor Papers, Peninsular Letter Book H, p. 401. McGrigor to Dickson, 16 December 1814.
I am grateful for permission to quote from these papers, which are in the possession ofthe Aberdeen
Medico-Chirurgical Society.
'I Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 39.
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clerks were unable "to keep the account ofmoney advanced to the purveyor in proper
form, and the greater part of the time which the army spent in winter quarters, so
necessary for the arrangement of accounts, was absolutely lost. The quarterly return
of stores of the 20 November 1813 was not made up until the 20 February 1814."51
It was just as well that the war ended before the effects of the delay could be felt.
James'sallegedlackofadministrative skillisborneoutbypost-warevents: themedical
board refused to sanction various sections of his accounts because they were not
supported by the correct vouchers, and it was only with the help of McGrigor that
their informality was finally rectified.52
Catherwood's beliefthat James also encouraged dishonesty does not seem to have
any basis in fact-it isfar more likely that in his willingness to delegate he mistakenly
gave too much responsibility to venal subordinates such as George Pratt. It should
be pointed out in defence of James, that when McGrigor wrote his autobiography,
after Gunson and Dickson had been dismissed, he saw no reason to change his view
of James, but said that "although I believe nearly half a million pounds had passed
through his hands, not a shilling of it stuck to them. So strictly honest was that
gentleman, that with a large family, he found difficulty in living in London, and it
took years of repeated applications through the Duke of Wellington to obtain the
addition of four shillings to the half-pay which he could claim on retirement from
the shortest service."53 And in all the investigations which the auditor-general carried
out, no mention ever seems to have been made ofJames, and it seems most unlikely
that anything suspicious in his behaviour would have escaped detection. Cather-
wood's accusations were probably derived from an unwillingness to extend the benefit
of the doubt to one whom he thought had deprived him of promotion. James and
Catherwood had not worked together easily-Catherwood had probably shown his
contempt for James's lack of method rather too openly, whereas James must have
found his clerk's air ofoverworked, martyred duty very irritating.
It will be asked what effect this systematic peculation had upon the army and the
medical department in particular. It might seem at first glance that the sick did not
suffer at all, for ifwhat Fairman said was true, they were supplied efficiently because
any lapse would have attracted attention, and might have led to an investigation.
The purveyors made money less by depriving the sick than by overcharging the
government. In another sense, however, it all came to the same thing, for the money
appropriated by the purveyors could have been used to pay offbills outstanding, thus
helping to restore the credit of the army in the Peninsula, and making it easier to
obtain supplies later.
It might even be said that the sick did suffer as a result of Gunson's relationship
with Moreira, for the latter was in such a strongposition that he could have provided
substandard goods without fear of reprimand or the termination of his contract.
Manoel de Freitas claimed that delay occurred because Moreira sent goods from
Lisbon which could have been obtained in Coimbra for the hospitals, and also that
on arrival, these stores were found to be of poor quality. The disadvantage to the
61 Ibid., p. 40.
6McGrigor Papers, op. cit., note 49 above, p. 404. McGrigor to James, 15 June 1815.
68 Sir James McGrigor, Autobiography andservices, London, 1861, p. 360.
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sick ofhaving to wait for shipments from the Tagus was obvious, but Freitas' second
claim should be taken with a pinch of salt, as he had been cheated by Moreira, and
was owed "more than 200 milreis" (over £56).5 It should also be remembered that
such widespread corruption resulted in a strained atmosphere between the medical
men and some of the purveyors: the former became suspicious of the latter, who in
turn established themselves as a separate clique instead of being assimilated into the
administrative team.
In view of such suspicions, it is remarkable that fraud was allowed to continue so
long unchecked. When McGrigor came out to the Peninsula in January 1812, he
had orders to investigate stories that there had been great waste and profusion in the
purveyor's and apothecary's departments," and Wellington gave him some anony-
mous letters on the subject which had arrived a few weeks before. Even so, McGrigor
could find nothing more than a tendency to extravagance, and the deterioration of
goods kept in store too long. Towards the end of the war, however, he could not
help being aware that the situation had grown worse: in a circular letter to the
principal medical officers ofhospital stations, he said "the accounts ofthe peculations
committed in the general hospitals of this country have even reached England, and
I have received several communications on the subject .... It is stated to me that at
some hospital stations, robbery and peculation have become so familiar that the
sense of the criminality of such conduct has been lost.... I cannot help thinking,56
he went on, that ifthe gentlemen ofthe purveyor's department discharged their duty
more zealously, robbery and peculation from the stores could not take place."57 This
lettershows thatalthough McGrigorrecognized thatsomething was wrong, hehad no
idea ofhow the fraud was being perpetrated-he wasthinking ofschemes to cheat the
government of storesalready bought andpaid for, whereas the most money was being
madefrom fictitious transactions carried out atpurveyor anddeputy-purveyor level.
Medical men who worked in closer contact with the purveyors, such as staff-
surgeon(laterdeputy-inspector) G. J. Guthrie, had a betteridea ofwhat was going on,
but they were themselves so busy that they had no time to investigate it. Paperwork
already swallowed up too much time, they were always short of staff, and thus they
could not afford to carry out the close scrutiny of accounts which was the only way
to check fraud. Nor had they any real reason to interfere with the purveyors unless
they failed in the essential duty of providing food and supplies for the sick-a rare
occurrence. Neglect of that duty was immediately obvious and retribution corre-
spondingly swift-at San Sebastian, for example, deputy-purveyor Hardy was placed
under arrest and court-martialled for disobeying orders and feeding the sick on salt
meat and biscuit.
It should be emphasized that the venal purveyors were very clever in staving off
investigation, and Catherwood explains Dickson's importance in this respect very
clearly. He said that Dickson concealed his own dishonest activities by using sub-
ordinates such as George Pratt in "the secret arrangements of surplus affairs with
54 Audit Office/14/27/p. 69. Coimbra, 5 October 1816.
56 McGrigor, op. cit., note 53 above, p. 256.
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deputies in charge of hospital stations ... when apprehensive ofcommitting himself
by too much personal interference."58 This was found by the commissioners to be
true-the washerwoman Maria Rita, for example, said that it was Pratt who en-
couraged her to sign the fictitious receipts at Lisbon.5'
Nor did Dickson draw attention to himself by a display of wealth: Catherwood
said he was thought to have sent £10,000 to England by means ofbills purchased in
Oporto by one ofhis clerks, and at the beginning of 1813, to have deposited another
£5,000 with a merchant in Lisbon. The commissioners were able to trace many such
transactions back to Dickson, and they formed the chief evidence against him, as
with no private income he could scarcely have accumulated such sums honestly.
Catherwood also explains another factor which worked in Dickson's favour. He said
that the department was given the job of paying the wages of the officers of the
hospital staff ofthe army, and that although Dickson grumbled outwardly about the
extra work this entailed, he was secretly delighted, as it would afford a plausible
"explanation of an apparent advance of money from general hospital accounts, or
ofanyremittances to Englandwhichmightcometo light."60Evidenceinthe McGrigor
papers shows that the purveyors were indeed requested to pay the general hospital
staff, as well as the servants, owing to the difficulty and delay which had been ex-
perienced when orthodox paymasters had to travel round to the various stations.6
Dickson's ever-present concern to cover his tracks is well illustrated by this story
from Catherwood: when the scarcity ofmoney was at its height in 1813, Dickson had
so much wealth that he was afraid that after his accounts with the treasury should be
stated, it might be seen that he had spent more than he had received at the time.
Thus, "in order to prevent the bad impression which such an appearance would
make, he pretended to have borrowed a considerable sum from a commercial house
in Lisbon, on his own personal credit and security, in order to employ it for the public
service".62 Some of his deputies appear to have equalled his skill in dissimulation:
Macpherson at Vera told the clerk with whom he shared his profits to ride over to
headquarters, plead penury, and ask Hodges (one of the senior purveyors but an
honest man) for "two weeks wages in advance-it would look well."63
To draw suspicion awayfromhimself, Dicksonfrequentlycomplained ofthe calibre
of his subordinates in general, yet he never initiated proceedings against anyone.
When an independent investigation threatened ruin, declared Catherwood, Dickson
misused his position to rig theinquiry so thatnothingembarrassing could be revealed.
This was the case of Samuel Cooper, the deputy-purveyor at Coimbra, under whose
auspices "peculation was carried out to its greatest extent; notonly bythe more usual
means of producing a surplus of provisions, but by the more dangerous method of
58 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 10. He said ofPratt, "during more than two years while
he had been out there, he had never wanted money, but he had not drawn a penny from home.
Yet Mr. Pratt always made a handsome demonstration, and was usually called Count Pratt by the
canaille ofthe department."
'9 Audit Office/14/30/p. 144. 11 September 1817.
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61 McGrigor Papers, op. cit., note 49 above, Microfilm no. 6, p. 169 (in possession of the Royal
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altering figures in the daily diet abstracts, or prefixing new figures before computing
the monthly returns ofexpenditure."" The alterations were detected, and reported to
Dr. Tice, the senior medical officer at the station, but he was unwilling to press the
inquiry as hewasindebtto Cooper, andwashimselfguiltyofimproprietyby accepting
gifts of hospital stores from purveyor's clerk Fairman, for the use of his family.
Fairman then tried to blackmail Cooper, and the result was deadlock, their knives
in one another's backs like Tilburina and friends in The Critic. Tice finally held a
committee ofinquiry, butashewasverycarefulinhischoice ofwitnesses,andFairman
chose to resign, nothing was disclosed. The unsatisfactory nature of the inquiry still
managed to leak out, however, and a new court was ordered to assemble at Lisbon.
The situation looked very black indeed for Dickson, as he was to be assisted in his
investigations by staff-surgeon Hosack, who was noted for his integrity, and by
deputy-inspector Guthrie, who "had upon several occasions demonstrated by his
vigilance that he did not possess ... feelings of friendship towards the purveyor's
department."65 Afull investigation seemed inevitable, and by providing clues towards
the system of peculation carried on elsewhere, Dickson's own ruin seemed only a
matter oftime.
Catherwood was ordered to take minutes of the court proceedings when it met in
March 1813, but he stated that the whole concern suffered a severe setback when it
was learned that Cooper had absconded. Against Dickson's advice, Guthrie asked
the British Ambassador to organize a search for the missing defendant, but it was
unsuccessful. All the court could do in his absence was to examine the accounts, and
Dickson was able to show that the arithmetic was perfectly correct. The court subse-
quently decided that "there was no ground of suspicion against him, other than his
having absented himself ... and that even upon that score, some allowance should
be made for the feelings of a timid man accused of so serious a crime."66 The latter
observation was apparently inserted by Dickson despite the disapproval of Guthrie,
to whom ffight savoured far more of an admission ofguilt. Cooper was thus merely
superseded for having gone absent without leave, and he was said to have turned up
in England in 1816, demanding the arrears of pay due up to the date of his super-
session.
Fairman was then summoned to appear before the court, but his testimony was not
enlightening; Catherwood heard that deputy-purveyors Pratt and Bishop had bribed
Fairman with 3,000 dollars (£675) of Dickson's money to blacken his own character,
which he was willing to do now that he had left the service. He then pleaded ill health,
and refused to attend any more, and the court, feeling that in any case little reliance
could be placed on the word of so dissolute a man, terminated the proceedings. All
that happened to Fairman was his incarceration for twenty days in Fort St. George,
on Wellington's orders, and Dickson was safe once more.
Remarkablethoughthisstoryseems, thereis reasontobelieveittrueinitsessentials:
a biography of Guthrie states that "during his stay in Lisbon, serious charges of
peculation ... were brought under his notice ... which he was ordered to investi-
"Ibid., p. 19.
"Ibid., p. 20.
"Ibid., p. 23.
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gate",67 and on the 31 March 1813, McGrigorinformed the medical board in London
that "deputy purveyor Cooper against whom charges for peculation were adduced,
has absented himself from this service without leave."68
It might be said that McGrigorwas atfault in beingtotally mistaken in his estimate
of Dickson's character. Catherwood shows that Wellington had a poor opinion of
Dickson, but McGrigor, although he "always knew that Dr. Dickson was a man ofa
bad temper and of a tyrannical disposition, yet . .. thought him an honest man",69
and defended him against Wellington's complaints. At Lesaca, for example, late in
1813, the case of deputy-purveyor Hardy's neglect of duty was followed by the in-
subordination of deputy-purveyor Saunders, and these two incidents reinforced
Wellington's beliefthat Dickson was unfitted for his situation: it seems that only the
support of McGrigor prevented his dismissal. It was a pity, however, that McGrigor
trusted Dickson, for the task of stamping out abuses was left to the initiative of the
departmental head, who had no intention ofdoing any such thing.
On the other hand, Dickson projected a very clever simulation of honesty, which
McGrigor could hardly have seen through when their acquaintance was an official
relationship ofletters, reports and occasional meetings. And as Dickson's demeanour
satisfied McGrigor, it was natural to leave him to manage his department: inter-
ference would have savoured of lack of confidence, and in any case, McGrigor was
far too busy, like the staff-surgeons at general hospital level, to duplicate the work
that had been delegated to others. All he could do was to "mark strongly the conduct
of undeserving officers"70 when they came his way. McGrigor defended Dickson
because it was always his policy to give "uniform support"'7' to well-meaning sub-
ordinates, and he thought Dickson was doing this best under very unfavourable
circumstances.
Catherwood's revelations are so detailed and comprehensive that it is natural to
suppose that he was directly and chiefly responsible for the detection of Gunson's
and Dickson's crimes. On closer examination, however, it is obvious that the part he
played was relatively small. He first approached McGrigor in February 1816, and
offered to disclose all he knew in return for promotion, but the auditor-general had
already arrived in Portugal and had begun to examine the merchant Moreira and
other witnesses in July 1815. These investigations revealed anomalies and sowed
disquiet in the minds of the authorities quite independently of anything said by
Catherwood.
It isinteresting to note how the auditor-general was sentto Lisbonin thefirstplace.
C. M. Clode declared that when statutory power was conferred upon the comp-
trollers (a branch ofthe treasury) for the examination ofarmy accounts, such savings
were effected by them in military expenditure that the government decided to appoint
a fourth comptroller "with a separate establishment to act with the Army abroad,
and to exercise powers still more extensive than those which were entrusted to his
67 Lancet, op. cit., note 38 above.
Il McGrigor Papers, op. cit., note 49 above, p. 268. McGrigor to A.M.B., 31 March 1813.
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70 McGrigor Papers, op. cit., note 49 above, p. 402. McGrigor to Dickson. 16 December 1814.
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colleagues at home."72 In consequence ofthis decision, Richard Dawkins was ordered
"to proceed at once to Spain or Portugal, there to exercise his office under the
direction and control ofthe Treasury, with authority to require all persons receiving
money or public stores for which they were accountable, to render an account ofthe
same on oath, and to exhibit all papers and vouchers necessary to substantiate the
account."73
It seems, however, that the credit for this innovation belongs to Wellington, for
he wrote to Lord Bathurst on 13 April 1813 and suggested that "an auditor general
ofaccounts should be attached to this army, with thepowerofcallingupon all persons
to whom public money may be entrusted, or to whose charge stores may be delivered
either forissue orotherwise, to account forthe same and to pass finally such accounts.
The auditor general should have the means and power ofinquiring into the prices of
articles, and the conduct of persons entrusted with the expenditure of public money
or the charge or issue of stores."74 It was also Wellington's idea that the auditor-
general should reside at Lisbon for the final examination of the army accounts.
Wellington was inspired by various motives: he thought that the system whereby
Sir Robert Hugh Kennedy, the commissary-general, was the only person accountable
to the public was both unfair and unsatisfactory. The sums involved were so large
that it took far too long to discharge them and give Kennedy his quietus, and it
was unreasonable that he should be "responsible for the acts and conduct of his
deputies, for theirhonesty and abilities and theirfitness-fortheir situations and duties,
although they are appointed by other authorities over which the commissary general
has no control."75 Wellington wanted Kennedy to remain the head of finance with
the army, but that his responsibility for money should cease with the production ofa
receipt from the officer to whom money was given for properly sanctioned purchase
or expenditure, and such an officer should be responsible for the account of such
expenditure and of rendering the account within a limited duration. This would cut
down the period of waiting, and the control of the audit office over the accountants
would be immediate and direct.
The treasury did not comply with all Wellington's requests, but it did appoint
Richard Dawkins as auditor-general, and he arrived with a staff of fifteen to be
noticed in General Orders on 14 November 1813. He established an office in the
Rua do Collegio dos Nobres76 in Lisbon, where witnesses were examined under oath
in the company of a Portuguese judge, a notary and the British Vice-Consul,77 and
the proceedings written down, wherever necessary, in Portuguese and English. The
same procedure was carried out when Dawkins pursued his researches in Coimbra,
Abrantes, and other towns.
Dawkins had to examine the accounts of the commissariat as well as those of the
purveyors, so it is not surprising thatpersons concerned with Gunson's and Dickson's
72 C. M. Clode, The militaryforces ofthe Crown, London, 1869, p. 192. 78 Ibid.
74 The dispatches ofFieldMarshal the Duke of Wellington, vol. X, London, John Murray, 1838,
p. 289. W. to Bathurst, 14 April 1813. 76 Ibid., p. 288.
76 Now the Rua da Escola Polit6cnica.
7 Sebastiao Jos6 Xavier Botelho, D. J. M. de Mendonga, George Hewson.
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accounts were not summoned until 1815. The examination ofMoreira and tradesmen
like Francisco Lourenqo and Gregorio SimOens were sufficient, however, to show that
little reliance could be placed upon the accounts and vouchers submitted by Gunson.
At the same time and for reasons best known to himself, Edward Fairman had
written to the treasury, alleging that fraud had been committed by some of his
former associates, and these letters were passed on to the comptrollers of army
accounts in London on 25 and 30 January 1816.78 The following March they were
sent to Dawkins, and in June the treasury decided that Fairman would join him in
Lisbon.
Thus when Catherwood offered to tell the authorities in London all he knew about
irregularities in the Peninsula, he found them better informed than he expected.
But the report that Dickson, as well as Gunson, was guilty of fraud was new to
McGrigor, and he told Catherwood "ifthese things can be proved against him, not-
withstanding our acquaintance, I shall not regret the most ignominious punishment
that may be inflicted upon him."79 Advising Catherwood that it was now more likely
that promotion would be forthcoming, if he rendered "assistance in bringing these
affairs to light",80 McGrigor then referred him to the treasury. Catherwood was
informed late in July that year that he would be given every encouragement to reveal
all he knew, and that any claims he felt entitled to make concerning compensation
would receive due consideration. On 10 August 1816 he again requested promotion,
and explained that the information he could give in exchange consisted of a des-
cription of the system ofpeculation practised within the department, and the relation
of "some interesting circumstances which have come to my knowledge."81 He also
said that he was able to call "viva voce evidence to prove some particular acts of
peculation, and to point out a method by which, I doubt not, numerous facts of a
like nature would be brought to light."82 This letter was sent to Lisbon by the
comptrollers, and it was March 1817 before Catherwood received a reply.
The comptrollers suggested that he take a temporary post in the audit office, where
he would be employed in examining the accounts of the purveyors; with a salary of
£200 per annum, a lump sum of £100, and the prospect of further advancement if
he rendered "essential service to government".83 Catherwood still wanted promotion,
however, and as he was about to take up a new post elsewhere, the audit office pre-
sented no charms to him. He thus refused the offer and the authorities considered
the matter closed. Catherwood himselfnever seems to have raised the question again.
Catherwood therefore contributed little to the process of detection. The credit
belongs mainly to Dawkins, for it was the examination of witnesses throughout
Portugal during 1816 and 1817 which established the guilt of Gunson and Dickson.
On 12 November 1817, the auditors informed the lords of the treasury that "state-
78 Audit Office/17/138/p. 250. Comptrollers' Office, 24 June 1816. John Erskine and John King
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ments ofgreat malversation and fraud in the department ofpurveyor to the forces"84
had been obtained, and it was therefore desirable that proceedings against the two
purveyors-general should proceed without delay, subject only to the advice of the
treasury solicitor.
No such action was taken in 1818, because Dawkins had sent Fairman home to
compare the stoppage returns submitted by the purveyors with those from thevarious
regiments. It was a long job which went on into 1819, but it was rewarded by the
discovery of enormous discrepancies. More would doubtless have been uncovered if
it were not for the fact that some registers-such as those for Coimbra-were missing
or incomplete.
In June 1820 the comptrollers were again ready to institute proceedings against
thetwopurveyors, whenaletterfromDawkinsarrived,sayingthatfurtherinformation
might be obtained against them from a Scottish merchant called Shirreff. Another
delay thus occurred while the fresh line ofinquiry was being pursued. It was unsuc-
cessful, but in the meantime Dawkins had sent home a clue to the moneytransmitted
to England by Gunson and Dickson, and after the examination of several bankers
and agents, "the immense extent of the remittances"85 was established "beyond all
doubt".86 Taken as a whole, remarked the comptrollers, the papers which they were
submitting to the lords of the treasury "contain such evidence of the large fortunes
realized by . . . [Gunson and Dickson] without any other apparent means than that
of frauds committed upon the public, and forming probably but a small portion of
the real loss sustained bythismisconduct",87 thatit seemed neither right nordesirable
that the purveyors "should escape with asimpledismissal, if anypossible mode could
be devised of bringing them tojustice."88
In October 1822, George Harrison, secretary to the lords ofthe treasury, requested
the treasury solicitor to take the necessary stepsfor the immediate removal ofGunson
and Dickson from the service, and, as both were residents of Scotland, he asked
whether it might be "expedient to have an immediate communication with the lord
advocate of Scotland . . . with a view both of rendering the Parties amenable to
justice and to prevent the removal or concealment of any property of which these
parties may bepossessed in thatpart ofthe United Kingdom."89 The solicitor worked
quickly and on 15 November 1822 Gunson and Dickson were ignominiously
dismissed.
It is not known whether civil or criminal proceedings were then begun against the
purveyors, or whether any of the money was recovered-their lives after their dis-
missal remain a mystery. One comment, however, remains to be made-that it was
not surprising that Sir Robert Hugh Kennedy underwent so much time and trouble
trying to discharge his accounts: quite apart from the amount and complexity of
" Audit Office/8/t3/p. 337. 12 November 1817. Commissioners of Audit to the lords of the
treasury.
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the paperwork, the comptrollers, with Gunson and Dickson fresh in their minds, were
doubly suspicious ofany anomaly, and they had to be convinced that the commissary-
general really was an honest man and not a swindler.
In the light of their previous depredations, it seems rather odd that subordinate
officials such as Pratt and Bishop should retain their jobs. But if one considers just
how honest these public officials were expected to be, the decision to make an example
ofthe big fishes and to spare the small fry seems to bejustice only slightly tempered
with mercy. A comparison with the commissariat department is instructive, for the
purveyors and the commissaries laboured under similar disadvantages. The life of a
commissary was not aneasy one, forwork during a campaign was arduous, thankless,
and considering its importance, relatively ill-paid. For a long time, therefore, it was
"the last refuge of decayed merchants and rogues intent upon supplementing their
official income from the disposal of public money and stores entrusted to them.""°
S. G. P. Ward has said that "it was almost expected of a commissary that he would
defraud the public"9' and this naturally encouraged a low standard of honesty.
According to Wellington, "the prejudice of society against a commissary almost
prevents him from receiving the common respect due to the character of a gentle-
man",92 so no wonder men ofeducation and integrity were rarely willing tojoin this
branch ofthe service. Colonel Willoughby Gordon and J. C. Herriestried to raise the
standard ofofficers admitted to the commissariat by instituting entrance examinations
in English and arithmetic, followed by personal interviews with the commissary-in-
chief,93 but the quality of the candidates who submitted themselves was so low, and
the need of the army for staff so great that little discrimination could be exercised,
and the situation was little better than before.
Ifthis was true ofthe commissariat, it was even more true ofthe purveyor's depart-
ment. During his term as surgeon-general, Thomas Keate had tried to improve the
quality of prospective candidates by introducing an examination to test their know-
ledge of accounts, but when Catherwood was interviewed by the accountant at the
medical board office, the latter apparently "satisfied himself touching my skill at
arithmetic by demanding 'ifthe quartern loafof 5 lb 8 oz. cost 1ld., what will 100 lb
ofbreadcost?' with one ortwoofthesamenature."94 AndwhenCatherwood declared
that he would have preferred ajob in the commissariat, the opportunity ofpeculation
was held out to him as an inducement to join-"when on service, he might save all
his pay".95
McGrigor, indeed, felt that the low pay of the deputy-purveyors and their clerks
held out a very natural temptation "'to remunerate themselves out of what passes
through their hands."" But ifsome degree ofcorruption was inevitable, he was also
convinced that it could and should be limited by the vigilance ofthe seniorpurveyors.
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The crimes ofGunson and Dickson were thus doubly serious, for besides defrauding
the public on a scale far exceeding that of their subordinates, they were responsible
for having fostered a climate of opinion in which embezzling was so much the norm
that it was difficult to be honest. Pratt and his friends would never have dared to
milk the government so much if McGrigor, rather than Dickson, had been their
immediate superior officer. Dickson's conduct is even more unpardonable when seen
in a wider context, for he took advantage of the priority given by Wellington to the
medical department's demands for money, to line his own pockets when the supply
of specie was at its lowest, and the wages of officers and men months in arrear.
Catherwood himself does not seem to have had an attractive personality, and he
played only a minor role in the discovery offraud committed by the purveyors. His
'Narrative', however, is unique-the only memoir to have been written by a member
ofthis important, iflittle-known sub-department-although inview ofthepotentially
explosive subject-matter, the silence ofhis colleagues is perhaps quite understandable.
Catherwood turns over the stone to reveal the extent of the corruption wriggling
beneath, and the truth of his main arguments and many of his details are borne out
by such impeccable independent sources as Richard Dawkins. But while the evidence
presented by the auditor-general is mostly undigested, Catherwood provides a com-
mentary on a complex situation, bringing it alive by showing how people and isolated
incidents fit into the general pattern. It is an important source for those interested in
the medical service of the army in this period, but historians of the Peninsular War
would also find it both fascinating and useful. This manuscript therefore deserves to
be more widely known.97
97 I am at present editing Catherwood's 'Narrative' with a view to publication.
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